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Can Forecasters’ M otives  
E xplain  R ejection  
o f th e  R ational 
E xp ectation s H ypothesis?




The predictions of the rational expectations hypothesis have been re­
jected by analysis of surveys of expectations. These results have left 
many economists unconvinced, partly because of econometric problems, 
but largely because the rational expectations hypothesis is tested along 
with the auxiliary hypothesis that survey participants aim to minimize 
squared forecast errors. It is often argued that a careful analysis of survey 
participants true aims would reconcile their predictions with the ratio­
nal expectations hypothesis. This paper presents a model in which fully 
rational agents choose to make forecasts different from the conditional 
expected value of the variable forecasted. This model is interesting be­
cause it implies that it is rational to extrapolate short run trends in 
forecasts. More importantly, the model yields simple predictions which 
are tested using predictions of interest rates from the North Holland Eco­
nomic Forecasts publication. The predictions of the rational expectations 
hypothesis with a quadratic loss function and with our model are both 
rejected. The failure of an effort to reconcile forecastable errors with the 
rational expectations hypothesis strengthens the evidence against the hy­
pothesis.
*We would like to thank Gerhard Orousel, Danny Quah and Ailsa Roell for helpful com­





















































































































































































1 In tro d u ctio n
The rational expectations hypothesis as formulated by Muth implies that agents 
minimize the expected value of losses due to forecast errors. W ith the com­
mon auxiliary hypothesis that these losses are quadratic in the forecast errors, 
it yields the prediction that forecast errors are uncorrelated with information 
available to the forecaster. One apparently direct and appealing approach to 
testing this hypothesis is to interpret the responses to surveys of expectations 
as such forecasts. It has been repeatedly found that survey forecast errors are 
correlated with available information (Carlson [1977], Ehrbeck [1992], Figlewski 
and Wachtel [1981], Ito [1990], Pearce [1979], Pesando [1975]).
These results have not convinced most economists that the hypothesis is 
false. Some report unconvincing conclusions because of statistical problems, 
however the conclusion remains after correction of these problems. The strong 
assumptions about the aims of the survey participants are more problematic. 
Among other things, the assumption of a simple quadratic loss function is based 
on the dubious analogy between speech and action. In other words, on the 
assumption that participants accurately report the expectations they use when 
acting.
Rational agents may choose differently, if honesty is not always the best 
policy. We present a model in which a rational professional forecaster chooses 
forecasts in order to convince his clients that his forecast errors are small. Need­
less to say, this provides an incentive to report forecasts close to the forecasters 
belief about the expected value of the variable forecasted. If the forecasted 
makes repeated forecasts about the same event, it also makes it undesirable to 
admit that earlier forecasts were wrong. A forecaster who continually changes 
his prediction, convinces his client that he has poor information. This implies 
rational stubbornness where the forecasters adjust their public forecasts too 
little in response to new information.
This yields the simple prediction that forecast errors are negatively corre­
lated with changes in forecasts. It thus implies that rational clients extrapolate 
changes in forecasts. In Nash equilibrium, clients do not make systematic fore­
cast errors. The efforts of professional forecaster to convince their clients that 
they have precise information might reduce the efficiency of communication, but 
it does not cause systematic confusion. This is a common pattern in models of 
communication. The revelation principle can be interpreted as implying that 




























































































but always honest report of their beliefs. If the actual signal is interpreted as 
part of the outcome many equilibria called, e.g. English and German, are possi­
ble. In our example a change of a stated forecast “means” that the forecasters’ 
beliefs about the conditional mean of the variable forecasted have changed by 
a greater amount.
An even simpler example of a game in which rational agents say things 
which sound irrational, are statements about the accuracy of one’s predictions. 
If their is any asymmetric information about the quality of information, it is 
obviously rational to overstate the precision of one’s forecast. Indeed survey 
participants consistently report subjective overconfidence (Alpert and Raiffa 
[1959], Einhorn and Hogarth [1978], Lichtenstein, Fischoff and Fillips [1982], 
Tversky and Kahneman [1971]). Alpert and Raiffa report that when asked for 
e.g. a 90% confidence interval agents give an interval which contains the true 
value only 50% of the time.
This could clearly result from a compromise between accurately reporting 
ones modesty and not wishing to give the impression that one has much to be 
modest about. The choices of experimental subjects facing risk show excessive 
fear of low probability extreme events (Tversky and Kahneman [1974]). The two 
anomalies might explain each other. If Alpert and Raiffa’s survey participants 
told Tversky and Kahneman’s experimental subjects about the probabilities, 
accurate communications might be achieved. When told that the probability 
that the payoff will be in an interval is 99% the experimental subjects would 
correctly conclude that the true probability was 90% and act accordingly. Of 
course Tversky and Kahneman were not overstating their knowledge about the 
behavior of their random number generator, so their subjects actions can’t  be 
rationalized by this argument. The argument is that they made a mistake based 
on a false analogy between the meaning of, say, the phrase 10% in everyday 
English and its meaning in probability textbooks and Kahneman and Tversky’s 
laboratory.
One interesting application of the model of rational stubbornness requires 
us to relax the strong rationality assumption as in the simpler example of ra­
tional boasting above. If the disillusioned clients of professional forecasters 
attempt to make their own forecasts based on the market price, they might 
conceivably rely on the following faulty analogy between asset prices and stated 
forecasts. “I know that people are reluctant to admit earlier forecasts were 
wrong and that I should extrapolate changes in forecasts. The price of an asset 
is the market’s forecast of its value. Therefore to predict the value of an asset 




























































































This reasoning would be faulty because market participants put their 
money where their mouth is and are therefore likely to base their actions on 
their true beliefs. Such faulty reasoning could explain survey and experimental 
results which show a tendency to overestimate future asset prices when the as­
set has recently increased in value (Case and Shiller [1988], Frankel and Froot 
[1988], Andreassen and Kraus 1988, Smith Suchanek and Williams [1988]). This 
particular bias is very important since it can cause destabilizing speculation in 
particular since fully rational investors find it more profitable to ride bubbles 
caused by extrapolative expectations than to nip the tulips in the bud. For 
explanation of extrapolation of price changes to be true it must be rational to 
extrapolate changes in the stated forecasts of professional forecasters.
The implications of our model are then tested empirically with a small 
panel data set of forecasts of U.S. interest rates. The forecasters in this partic­
ular data set do not revise their stated predictions too little as implied by the 
theory. To the contrary, they over-adjust their public announcements. Our at­
tempt to save the rationality postulate in expectations by providing a rationale 
for apparently systematic mistakes in stated predictions is thus refuted.
2 A  M o d e l o f  A d v ice
Let there be two agents in the following, simple model of advice -  an advisor 
and a client. The advisors supplies the client with predictions of the value of 
a random variable. The client uses these stated predictions to form his own 
forecast of the value of the variable. The client also attempts to determine 
the quality of the advisor’s information analyzing the stated forecasts and the 
realized value of the predicted variable. If the client concludes that the advisor 
has poor information, he terminates the relationship and looks for a new advisor. 
The advisor attempts to convince the client that he has high quality information. 
For simplicity, we assume a cynical advisor who has no other aim.
To be more specific, assume that the client wishes to learn the expected 
value of a random variable y but has no information on it. He asks an advisor 
to predict it for him. There are various advisors indexed by i. The advisor 
i receives a signal Si in period one and «2 in period two. Each signal is an 


































































































ei,e2 ~  IV(0,fff)
The expected value of y conditional on si is s i and the expected value of 
y conditional on Si and s2 is
Si +  s2 
2
In period one, the advisor tells the client that he expected value of y is 
fx and in period two the advisor tells the client that the expected value is / 2. 
These predictions may or may not be equal to the advisors best predictions 
based on his information. In fact, the advisor will have an incentive to report 
a prediction / 2 which is not equal to
si +  s2 
2 '
In each period, the client attempts to correct for any bias in the stated 
predictions f \  and / 2 and to forecast y. The client also attempts to estimate 
of -  the measure of the quality of advice. For notational convenience, we 
supress the subscript i in the remainder of this section. If the estimated a2 is 
high, the client terminates the relationship. For simplicity, we assume that the 
probability of termination is proportional to a2. If the client does not terminate 
the relationship, the game is repeated with new values of y, Si and s2.
First, we ask whether honesty is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, 
that is, is there a Nash equilibrium in which the advisor reports / i  =  si and
Si +  s2 
J 2 -  2
and in which the client knows that he does so ? The answer is no. If the client 
believes that the advisor is honest, the advisor has an incentive to tell him
h  +





























































































To see this, consider alternative, not so honest strategies in which the advisor 
reports f i  =  Si and fa =  (1 — a)si +  as2- If the client assumes a =  the 
advisor benefits from using a < 5. This results from the way the client tries to 
estimate er2.
In the first period, the client has no information on a2. In the second 
period, the client who believes that a =  5 can use the following formula to 
deduce that quality of advice from the stated predictions:
The expected value of expression (2) is E (â2) = a2 as desired.1
If, however, the advisor uses the alternative, not so honest strategies, 
equation (2) changes to:
The expected value of expression (3) is E(a2) =  \a?a2. By chosing a < | ,  
the unscrupulous advisor can trick the client into underestimating a2, i.e., into 
overestimating the quality of the advisor’s information. By using a < | ,  the 
advisor is refusing to admit that his first signal was different from his current 
best estimate of y. If the client assumes that the advisor is not doing this, he 
will be tricked into believing that Sj was closer to y than it was.
'Note <t2 is not only unbiased under the assumption that a = 5 , but also achieves the 
Cramer-Rao lower bound under the same assumption. This means that a2 is a complete 
sufficient statistic and therefore a sufficient statistic. This means that the likelihood of a2 is 
a function of <r2 and a2 and so if the client, e.g. uses Bayesian updation of a prior on a2 to 
decide whether to go look for a new advisor, the optimal approach is to first calculate a2. 
Note even if the client is only interested in var( /2 — y) that this is a function of a2 and 
is the best unbiased estimate of var( /2 — y). It is at least as good as any other and strictly 
better than, e.g. the sample average of past ( /2 — y)2.
2( /a -  h f (2)
2(/a _  / 2)2





























































































This trick is not costly to the advisor in period three when the client learns 
the true value of y. In fact, the trusting client will continue to overestimate the 
quality of the information of the unscrupulous advisor who refuses to admit 
errors. In the third period, the client can extract estimates of the errors in the 
signals Si and S2, using the assumption that f i  = y + e 1 and that = y + LL̂ 2-.
Assuming a =  5, he calculates:
.2 =  i f i - y )2 (2/2 - f x - y ?  
2 2
=  2 ^ ' + € 2)
(4)
The expected value of expression (4) is again E (â2) =  a2. If, however, the 
advisor uses the alternative, not so honest strategies, equation (4) changes to:
2̂ , [(1 — 2a)ei +  2ae2]2
a ~ J + 2 (5)
The expected value of expression (5) is:
E t f )  -  ^ + '(1 - 2° ) ; + 4 0 > î  (6)
=  (4a2 — 2a +  l)a 2
which is increasing in a.
If the client believes that the advisor is using a =  5, the advisor has an 
incentive to use a < that is, to revise his first stated prediction by less than 
the new information warrants. By refusing to admit that his first prediction 
was inaccurate, the advisor can trick such a naive client into believing that has 
better information than he does. In this model, honesty is not the best policy. 
It is not a Nash equilibrium of the advising game to give advice which, if taken 
literally, is optimal.
Unfortunately, the game has no static pure strategy equilibrium in which 
all advisors follow the same strategy. For any positive A, the advisor gains by 
using a < A. The argument is the same as used above.
For a static pure strategy Nash equilibrium to exist, it is necessary for 




























































































is easier to discuss this if only two types of advisors are considered -  advisiors 
with low a, say <7 =  1, and advisors with a high <7, say greater than 1. If 
advisors with poor signals use weighting coefficients a lower than advisors with 
good signals, then refusing to admit one was wrong is a sign that one had poor 
information.
The client can attempt to estimate a by regressing the second forecast 
error (fo — y) on the change in foreacsts (/2 — /i) . If the advisor is being frank 
and f i  is the optimal forecast based on si and S2 , the expected value of this 
regression coefficient is zero2.
To see this, consider the OLS estimate of the regression coefficient:
If, however, the advisor uses the alternative, not so honest strategies, expression
(7) changes to:
T
Y ,  [“ (€(.2 — f t . l ]  [ (1  — 0 ) ( t .  1 +  0,Et .2 ]
Po ls  =  — --------- f ----------------------------------  (8)
[a(et.2 -  eu )]2
t= 1
The expected value of equation (8) is E (P o l s ) =  1 — If a =  | ,  the expected 
value is zero, as above. If a < 5, the expected value of E(P) < 0. Forecast error 
and change in the stated predictions are negatively correlated, that is, when, 
say, the change goes up, this has a negative effect on the forecast error, because 
the change should have been bigger if the advisor were honest.
In a game with more than one type of advisor, the possibility of inference 
about a changes the incentive structure. If advisors with poor information use 
a lower a than advisors with good information, correlation between the change 
and the final forecast errors is a negative signal about their ability. This implies 
that is is not always optimal for the advisor to use a lower a than the client 
believes he is using.




























































































3 A  S im p ler M o d e l o f  A d v ice
In this section the assumption about the distribution of the disturbances in the 
signals is changed. It is assumed that the ith advisor receives signals:
si =  V + <Ti(fii +  Vi) (9)
S2 =  y +  <7.(p>)
where a, is a parameter which describes the quality of the signal and:
l k ~ N (  0, 1)
Vi ~ { 1 with probability |  —1 with probability \
For still more simplicity assume that there are only two types of advisors -  some 
with cr, =  1 and the rest with a, = a > l.
In the second period, the optimal forecast of y is S2 - There is no reason 
why the able advisor would not frankly state his new prediction. The less able 
forecasters, however, will not state this prediction. If they did, the absolue 
value of their change in predictions, ( /2 — /i)  =  (s2 — Si) =  —(TiVi would be 
equal to <7, > 1. The client would know that the advisor received poor signals, 
since an able advisor would never change a prediction by more than 1 in either 
direction. The less able advisors rationally choose to adjust their predictions 
up 1 if S2 > Si and down 1 if s2 < s2. Observing only the stated predictions 
/ i  and / 2, the client has no way of distinguishing between able and not so able 
advisors.
When y is revealed, the client has some information on the quality of 
advice, but not enough to catch incompetence with certainty. This makes the 
dishonest strategy optimal.
To see why this leads to extrapolative expectations, consider a client who 
attaches probability p to the possibilty that his advisor is not able. This prob­
ability could be the proportion of not so able advisors or could be the posterior 
probability based on the advisor’s past record. When the advisor adjusts his 




























































































able and now giving the best forecast of y. He considers that with probability 
p the advisor should have adjusted the forecast by ct,. This means that the 
expected value of y given the two stated predictions is:
e(j/|/i,/2) = ( l - d ) / 2+ p [ /i+ ff ( /2 - / i ) ]  (10)
=  (1 -  d)f2 +p[h + { a -  1 )(/2 -  fi)]
— / 2 + p W ~  1 )(/2 ~ /i)
Since p > 0 and cr > 1, expression (10) says that the client rationally extrapo­
lates trends in forecasts as asserted.
This model is very simple, suspiciously simple. I particular, it is important 
that the not so able advisor will give himself away with certainty if he is frank. 
Similarly, it is important that the able advisors always adjust their forecasts by 
the same amount. This means that an able advisor who refuses to admit that 
he was wrong can gain nothing.
Finally, since able advisors are frank, it is possible that all clients end 
up with able advisors and forget about the need to extrapolate trends in the 
forecasts of advisors of dubious ability. This follows from the choice of only two 
classes of advisors. The able advisor cannot convince their clients that they are 
more able than they are, so they have no incentive for deceit. In a model with 
a continuum of advisors, it may be true that no advisor has an incentive to be 
frank.
Note two further issues. First, we assume that the client only has access 
to the forecast supplied by his advisor and eventual outcome y. If a claim on 
y is a traded asset, the client might also observe the market price of the claim 
on y. The client might also observe published forecasts of other advisors. This 
raises the issues addressed by Scharfstein and Stein [1990], Froot, Scharfstein 
and Stein [1990], and Bannerjee [1989]. Second, we have assumed that the 
variance of (si — y) is proportional to the variance (s2 — y)- If the variance of 
(si — y) is the same for all advisors and the variance of (s2 — y) differs, then 





























































































4 E m p irica l T est
To test the implication of the model of advice, data is necessary in which traca- 
ble forecasters predict several times the value of some economic variable for the 
same target period. One source of such data is the North Holland Economic 
Forecast publication. This monthly newsletter publishes forecasts from a panel 
of experts of key economic variables for industrialized countries.
The prediction variable used for this work is the forecast of the annualized 
discount rate on new issues of 91-day US-Treasury Bills, based on weekly auction 
average rates. This variable has been chosen because the panel for the U.S. is 
the richest and because interest rate forecasts predict a quoted price which 
excludes some ambiguities that could arise when predicting national accounting 
data.
The panel of experts submits prediction of the interest rate on a monthly 
basis for the quarters of the calender year. The forecast data have consequently 
been split in three, small homogeneous panels of first month, second month, and 
third month forecasts respectively. For the empirical test, only forecasts of those 
panel participants who reported at least 15 times over the sample period from 
January 1985 to June 1990 have been included. The cross-section dimension 
of the data is N  =  23. The times-series dimension is T  =  22. The average 
number of non-missing observations per participant is 18. The corresponding 
realization data come from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Quarterly discount 
rates are calculated as the simple average of the monthly data which, in turn, 
come from the average weekly auction rates already quoted on the annualized 
discount basis.
For the regression analysis, the data have been stacked across agents per 
period and along time:
Y =  X/? +  u (11)
where Y  is the T Yx 1-stack of second period forecast errors, X  is the TNx2- 
stack of constant terms and changes in predictions from the first period to 
the second period, (3 is the 2x1 vector of regression coefficients, and u  is the 
T TVxl-stack of disturbance terms.
When running such regressions, care needs to be taken for possible corre­




























































































the same aggregate shocks. Ignoring this potential correlation would lead to 
uncorrectly low standard errors and thus overrejection of the null hypothesis.
More precisely, we assumed:
E(ui,t) ~  ai f°r aU t= l  ... T ; i= l  ... N (12)
{pOiOj0 for all t= s  and i ^  j otherwise (13)
This specification allows for heteroscedasticity of the disturbances across units 
and for non-zero contemporaneous correlation between the disturbances in dif­
ferent units, but excludes (time) serial correlation. The common correlation 
coefficient p reflects the assumption of an aggregate surprise.
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(14)
Individual OLS regressions can be run for each forecaster separately to 
obtain residual series e,. These residuals series are used to estimate the elements 
of Q as follows:
and:
<7i =






























































































where Nij is the number of observations with non-missing forecasts for both 
forcasters i and j ,  and ptj is the correlation coefficient for any pair of forecasters 
(M o­
using fi, we can run the regression of the stacked data in equation (11) 
to obtain an estimate of /3 and correct the estimated standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates as follows:
covfr =  (X 'X )-1X 'fiX (X 'X ) - 1 (17)
The results of the three regressions using the changes from the first month 
to the third month, the first month to the second, and the second to the third as 
regressors are summarized in Table 1. In all three regressions, the estimated co­
efficients have the wrong sign, and significantly so. Forecasters in this particular 
sample do not choose a weight in order to trick clients into believing in superior 
information. To the contrary, the advisors in this panel put too much weight 
on their new forecast. Correcting for that bias would improve their forecast.
1
- ________
T a b le  1
T esting  for A dvisor’s Honesty*
Dependent Variable: (Forecast* - Outcome)
Regression Constant Change in Forecast
Change 3rd-1st -0.006 0.127 3 II CC cc
(-0.523) (4.470) R2=0.08
Change 2nd-1st - 0.022 0.230 N=396
(-1.050) (4.845) R2=0.095
Change 3rd-2nd -0.004 0.236 N=385
(-0.414) (6.134) R2=0.15




























































































5 C on clu sion
This paper proposes an advising game between optimizing experts and rational 
clients. The advisor provides the client with forecasts about the future value of 
a random variable. While doing so, he is concerned about his reputation and 
tries to make the client believe in the quality of his advice. The client on the 
other hand attempts to infer about the quality of advice.
When adjusting for potential bias in the advice, optimal behavior of 
the clients results in extrapolation of past trends - an observed phenomenon 
economists remain puzzled over. The main implication of the model, that ad­
visor fearful of their reputation under-adjust their stated old predictions, has 
been tested with a small panel data set of expert forecasts. The hypothesis is 
rejected. Coefficients have significantly wrong signs.
This result also rejects the rational expectations hypothesis with a quadratic 
loss function. Furthermore the failure of our effort to explain systematic fore­
cast errors with an optimizing model supports the view that this rejection is 
meaningful and not just the result our misunderstanding of the problem which 
agents were attempting to solve. Needless to say, one such failure does not 
imply that a more sophisticated model of the advising game could not reconcile 
our empirical results with the rational expectations hypothesis.
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Can Forecasters’ Motives Explain Rejec­
tion of the Rational Expectations Hypoth­
esis?
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